次级债券发行与银行监管市场约束  

Insurance of Subordinated Bond and Market Discipline of Banking Supervision

作　　者：程吉生[1] 孙聂娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国井冈山干部学院教学科研部,江西井冈山343600 [2]江西师范大学政法学院,江西南昌330022

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2006年第2期38-42,共5页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：江西省社科规划基金项目"外资银行监管法律制度研究"(05SH19)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：次级债券的“次级”、无担保地位和相对长的固定期限使其对银行风险具有极强的敏感性,并使投资者具有监督银行风险的内在动力。次级债券通过风险敏感的债务工具不仅使银行产生内在的抑制风险激励,而且通过市场参与者和监管机构的“反应”对银行形成风险约束的外部刺激。但次级债券发行也面临一系列诸如监管机构援助的消极激励、降低银行监管灵活性、价格信号的“噪音”干扰等问题,这些问题如不能得到很好地解决,必将影响次级债券市场约束作用的发挥。Subordinated bond has a lot of advantages over other instruments. The advantages generally derive from their junior status, relatively long maturity, etc. As a debt instrument, subordinated bond not only provides banking organizations with internal incentives to refrain from augmenting their risk, but also imposes additionnal incentives through participants and supervisors. Of course, there are a number of deficiencies about subordinated bond,such as bailouting of supervision, reducing the flexibility of supervisors and many force the supervision＇s hand.

关 键 词：银行监管 次级债券 监管约束 市场约束 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]