从城市政企博弈问题看城市经营制度风险  

Institutional Risk of Urban Management from Game Actions between Urban Government and Enterprises

作　　者：张金城[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《现代城市研究》2006年第5期33-36,共4页Modern Urban Research

基　　金：江苏省高校自然科学基金项目(04KJB520059)

摘　　要：通过对城市经营中典型政企博弈问题的分析,运用新制度经济学的方法解释城市经营中存在的制度风险,并说明制度风险是由于城市经营的制度缺陷,即特殊国情的约束条件下,政府追求自身效用最大化与作为整体的社会财富最大化之间的偏离所致。并强调这种内生的制度缺陷无法仅凭外部竞争有效化解,而必须切实转变政府职能,促进城市经营制度的创新,从而避免城市经营制度风险的产生。Analyzing the institutional risk of urban management by the methodology of neoclassical institutional economics and the game problem between urban government and enterprises, this paper finds that the institutional risk is originated from the institutional defect of urban management, which results from the conflict between the effect maximization pursued by the government and the maximization of the social wealth as a whole under current national conditions. It also emphasizes that the institutional defect can not be solved only by external competition. The right tendency of avoiding the creation of urban management system risk is to transfer the government role and promote the institutional renewal of urban management.

关 键 词：城市经营 博弈 经营风险 制度创新 

分 类 号：F299.2[经济管理—国民经济]