互联网骨干网互联的非合作博弈分析  

Non-Cooperative Game Analysis of Internet Backbone Interconnection

作　　者：宁连举[1] 杨庆丰[2] 石文华[1] 吕廷杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学文法经济学院,北京100876 [2]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报》2006年第2期62-64,共3页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

摘　　要：主要研究互联网骨干网之间的互联决策.为了分析2个互联网骨干网运营商(IBP)在互联过程中的行为表现,运用博弈论的方法,通过建立一个非合作博弈模型分析他们的互联决策.结论表明,当市场结构比较对称时厂商的理性行为是符合政府期望的.而当市场结构极不对称时显然厂商的行为是有悖于政府期望,一方面政府强制厂商之间的互联;另一方面也是最重要的,就是政府鼓励弱势IBP或ISP(互联网服务提供商)之间的互联以降低市场的不对称性,使厂商的行为符合政府及广大消费者的期望,这样才能从根本上解决互联互通问题.To analyze behavior of two Internet backbone provider（IBP） in the course of interconnection, a non-cooperative game model to analyze the interconnection decision between two IBP was developed. The conclusions show that the rational behaviors of the providers accord with the government when the market structure is relative symmetric, but when the market structure is extremely asymmetric the providers＇ behaviors are contrary to expectations of the government. The government forced interconnection between the providers; on the other hand, more importantly, the government should encourage interconnection between weak IBP or ISP in order to reduce asymmetry of market. It makes the behaviors of the providers accord with the expectations of the government and the consumers, only in this situation, the interconnection problem can be solved fundamentally.

关 键 词：互联互通 互联网骨干网 非合作博弈 

分 类 号：F019.11[经济管理—政治经济学]