不对称信息下的中小企业信用担保问题研究  

作　　者：杨胜刚[1] 胡海波[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融学院,湖南长沙市410079

出　　处：《金融研究》2006年第1期118-126,共9页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文首先从信息经济学角度回顾了西方信贷融资担保理论的重大进展,然后通过数理建模分析了信用担保机构的两种风险控制手段—比例担保和反担保的不同组合对中小企业信贷市场上逆向选择和道德风险的不同影响。Whether the existence of credit guarantee institution for small and medium- sized enterprises is meaningful to a certain extent depends upon whether it is helpful to solve the information asymmetry problem in credit market. This paper studies the premise and conditions of the credit guarantee function. Firstly the paper reviews the important evolution of loan guarantee theory from the perspective of information economies, then studies the impact of partial guarantee and anti- guarantee,the two instrument of risk management,on the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard by making a mathematical model, and explains it with guarantee theory. Finally some suggestions are proposed for credit guarantee systems on aforementioned model aimed at China＇s realities,

关 键 词：中小企业 信用担保 逆向选择 道德风险 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]