组织内部知识市场交易博弈模型及其实证分析  

A Game Model of Internal Knowledge Markets within an Organization and Its Empirical Analysis

作　　者：陈搏[1] 张喜征[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200030 [2]湖南大学管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2006年第4期109-115,共7页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

摘　　要：配置知识资源,市场机制还是最有效的方式。知识资源在组织内部员工之间的分布是不均衡的,博弈模型的分析表明掌握知识的组织员工只有在对价交换的条件下才会愿意长期地供应知识。组织是内部知识交易的最大受益者,组织应该作为第三方对知识供应者进行支付,而最有效的支付方式是在组织内部设立知识经纪人,并由其运作相关支付事宜。Market is the best efficient mechanism to collocate knowledge resource. The distribution of knowledge within the organization is unsymmetrical. By applying game model, the paper indicates that only in the condition of exchanging with something valuable the knowledge workers who create or grasp most organizational knowledge would supply their knowledge lastingly. The organizations benefit from the knowledge exchange within it, so that the organizations as the third party should pay for knowledge supplier, and then the most efficient payment mode is that the organization appoint the knowledge broker and pay for them.

关 键 词：知识市场 知识交易 知识经纪人 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学]