制造商应对强势零售商的战略反应及对我国零售业开放的启示  

Some Revelations to Opening to Retail Businesses in China: Manufacturers Responses to Dominant Retailers

作　　者：李骏阳[1] 夏爱萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学国际工商与管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2006年第3期296-301,共6页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172040)

摘　　要：在渠道关系中,制造商与零售商的利益往往是相互冲突的,制造商面对强势零售商时处于弱势,而面对弱势零售商时则处于强势。基于不同时期零售商零售成本对称与不对称, 以及强势零售商向制造商规定供货价格而弱势零售商接受制造商的供货价格这两个前提进行分析,通过图形和数学模型来分析制造商的2种战略行为——定价战略和促销战略,以及制造商如何通过这2种战略使其利润最大化。同时,结合中国零售业完全开放的国情,讨论在零售成本非对称的情况下,制造商的2种战略行为对增加其自身利益的有效性及对中国零售业的启示。There are benefit conflicts between manufactures and retailers in the channel relationships. Facing dominant retailers, manufacturers are in weakness; vice versa. The analysis is based on the following two prerequisites： （1） retail costs from retailers would show their symmetry or asymmetry in different periods; （2） dominant retailer fixes a wholesale price while weak retailers would accept this price. Direct viewing graph and mathematical model were employed to analyze the actions of manufacturers from two strategies, pricing and promotion strategies, and how the manufacturers maximize their own benefits by using these two strategies were discussed. From complete opening to retail shops in China, whether the benefits of retailers would be improved effectively by using the two strategies were discussed when the retail costs are asymmetric, and some revelations to opening to our retail businesses were presented.

关 键 词：零售商 制造商 定价战略 促销战略 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]