论信息非对称下债权契约的优化设计  

Optimal Design of Creditor's Contract with Informational Asymmetry

作　　者：邱长溶[1] 陈溪华[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学 [2]西安交通大学经济金融学院

出　　处：《金融论坛》2006年第3期58-63,共6页Finance Forum

摘　　要：由于信息的非对称,作为债券投资者的债权人与作为负债方的股东或经理就必然存在利益冲突。优化设计债权契约可以避免企业经理或股东对债权人的财富进行掠夺,或把债权人的财富损失减小到最小程度。债权契约的创新性设计主要是在债权契约中加入可赎回条款和可转换条款等内容,而所有这些设计都是为了解决信息不对称问题,即让债务人说真话。Because of symmetrical information access, a creditor as bond investor naturally has interest conflicts with a shareholder or manager as debtor. An optimally designed creditor＇s contract can help a creditor avoid being plundered by an enterprise manager or shareholder or can reduce his/her loss of wealth to the minimum. As an innovative part in the creditor＇s contract, a redeemable and/ or transferable clause should be added, All these designs are intended to solve the problem of information asymmetry, e.g. to urge the debtor to speak the truth.

关 键 词：债权契约 信息不对称 优化设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]