地方政府的博弈行为与耕地保护——一个基于公共物品私人供给模型的分析框架  

The Game Behaviors of Local Governments and Cultivated Land Protection——An Analytic Framework Based on the Model for Private Supply of Public Goods

作　　者：李边疆[1] 王万茂[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210095

出　　处：《中国软科学》2006年第4期39-45,共7页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70373020)

摘　　要：文章基于公共物品私人供给的模型,构建了耕地保护过程中地方政府在个体理性支配下同整体理性进行博弈的分析框架,并据此对实践中存在的耕地保护政策失效和政府间耕地保护意愿差异的现象进行了解析。结论认为,地方政府在个体理性支配下的博弈行为是耕地保护政策失效的主要原因之一;经济发达的东部沿海区地方政府比落后的西部内陆区地方政府有更强的耕地保护意愿,建立耕地异地代保市场可以将这种较高的意愿变为现实。Based on the model of private supply of public goods, the paper develops an analytic framework, which can demonstrate the local government dominated by private reason playing game with the whole reason in the process of protecting cultivated land. Then the paper applies the framework to explaining the policy invalidation and the desire differences between different local governments in the current practice. The results show that the game behavior of local governments dominated by private reason is one of the main reasons for policy invalidation;The developed local governments in the east have a stronger desire for cultivated land protection than the developing ones in the west, and construct a market to deputize for protecting cultivated land in other areas which can make this desire realize.

关 键 词：地方政府 博弈行为 耕地保护 分析框架 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]