美国决策层对1969年中苏边界冲突的判断与对策  

The U.S. Policy-makers' Judgment and Countermeasures to the 1969 China-Soviet Boundary Clash

作　　者：王成至[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院亚洲太平洋研究所

出　　处：《社会科学》2006年第5期129-136,共8页Journal of Social Sciences

摘　　要：1969年的中苏边界冲突对美国尼克松政府的对华缓和政策具有重要的推动作用．但从新近公布的解密档案和冷战史研究来看,边界冲突并不必然会导致美中接近;只是当苏联在边界冲突中的表现引起了尼克松政府对其战略意图怀疑时,美国政府才加快了启动对华缓和的进程．The 1969 China-Soviet boundary clash definitely facilitated the U.S. Nixon government to loosen up its China policy. But according to the latest declassified files pubfished by the U.S. and the new discoveries of the Cold War history reserch, the boundary clash was not bound to the contact between U.S. and China. It was just because the Soviet Union＇s performance during the boundary clash made the Nixon government suspicious to its strategical purpose that the U.S. speeded up the process of contacting with China.

关 键 词：中苏边界冲突 尼克松政府 美国对华政策 

分 类 号：D5[政治法律—政治学]