地方政府规制与规制外部性  

Local Governmental Regulation and Regulation Externality

作　　者：李项峰[1] 李郁芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济系,博士生510632

出　　处：《江苏社会科学》2006年第3期60-65,共6页Jiangsu Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"政府行为外部性的经济学分析"的阶段性成果;项目批准号:05BJL021

摘　　要：地方政府对外部性的规制可能会产生另一种外部性,即规制外部性。规制外部性是政府在制定与实施规制政策的过程中因自身的无效或被规制者的影响而产生的成本和收益转移。它是政府失灵的一种表现。与市场外部性比较,规制外部性可能影响配置、稳定、分配和增长。它的存在对政府干预的效率提出了质疑。因此,在外部性治理问题上,有效的政策选择必须考虑到这种规制外部性的大小。Local governmental regulation of externality may bring about another kind of externality, namely regulation externality. Regulation externality is a transfer of costs and benefits resulting from either the government＇ s inefficiency or the influence of the regulated in the process of making and implementing regulation policies. It is a sign of government failure. Compared with market externality, regulation externality may affect allocation, stabilization, distribution and growth, challenging the efficiency of governmental intervention. Therefore, regulation externality must be taken into account in the choice of an efficient policy concerning internalizing externality.

关 键 词：政府规制 市场外部性 规制外部性 

分 类 号：D67[政治法律—政治学]