实验博弈论研究的若干进展  

New Developments in Research on Experimental Game Theory

作　　者：高鸿桢[1] 王家辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学计划统计系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2006年第3期80-84,105,共6页Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70272014)

摘　　要：逻辑上无可挑剔的博弈论在对客观现实进行预测时却并非完全正确。正由于此,实验博弈论应运而生。其中最重要的因素是实验可以为研究提供有关策略行为原理的观测信息及有效的检验方法。实验博弈论中的典型论题,如标准型博弈中的学习和均衡选择、AM机制、讨价还价问题等都获得了显著的进展。关于最后通谍博弈和蜈蚣博弈,近年来相关的文献研究大量增加,各种实验设计巧妙,反映了实验博弈论研究的最新进展。然而,这一研究领域还有很多问题没有得到很好的解决,博弈论的研究还有很长的路要走。The fact that Game Theory （GT） which is impeccable in logic may prove irnperfeet in predicting what will happen in the objective world has brought about a field of study called Experimental Game Theory （ EGT ）. Experiments can provide observed data and validations for studying certain strategic behaviors and principles. Remarkable progress has been made in EGT on such issues as learning and choice of equilibriums in standard games, AM meehanism, bargaining, etc. In the research on ultimatum games and centipede games, there has been a great increase in intensive studies of relevant literature and variety of designs of experiments. They are new developments in EGT studies. However, this paper argues that many questions remain unanswered in the field of EGT and there is a long way to go for GT researchers. equilibriums, ultimatum game

关 键 词：实验博弈论 讨价还价 均衡选择 最后通谍博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]