一种三方不完全信息延伸威慑动态博弈模型  

A Dynamic Game Model of the Tripartite Extended Deterrence with Incomplete Information

作　　者：向钢华[1] 王永县[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《系统工程》2006年第4期40-43,共4页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：三方延伸威慑博弈,是一类在现实中普遍存在的多人博弈情形,较之两方威慑博弈更为复杂。本文提出了一种与传统延伸威慑博弈模型不同的新的三方危机博弈模型,分析了在三方信息均不完全条件下局中人的策略选择,求解了博弈模型的威慑均衡、挑战均衡和分离均衡。The tripartite extended deterrence game is a kind of multi-person game which widely exists in our real world and is more complicated than the two-party game. The paper proposes a new tripartite extended deterrence model which is different from the traditional one,analyzes the players＇ strategy .selection with tripartite incomplete information,and deduces the deterrence equilibrium ,the challenge equilibrium and the separate equilibrium of the model.

关 键 词：延伸威慑 三方博弈 不完全信息 危机 干预 

分 类 号：E81[军事—战略学]