我国部门预算委托代理问题的制度分析  

System Analysis of Trust and Agency Problems in China Departmental Budget

作　　者：曹艳杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门国家会计学院,福建厦门361009

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2006年第3期74-76,共3页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：作为纳税人的社会公众与政府之间本质上是一种委托代理关系。在部门预算中,该委托代理关系表现出多环节的委托授权链条。针对目前政府部门预算中由于信息不对称、监督弱化而导致的腐败和共谋问题,提出了解决代理问题的对策。This paper first attempts to apply the theory of trust and agency to study the problems of government budget. The theory reveals the relationship between the government and the public as well as tax payers, in essence, is a kind of trust and agency, which embodies multi-link authorizing chains in departmental budget. In order to solve the problems of corruption and malpractice by information asymmetry and weakened supervision, the author puts forward some proposals to perfect the existing supervision system.

关 键 词：委托代理 部门预算 监督体系 

分 类 号：F812.3[经济管理—财政学]