风险投资在信息不对称条件下的委托代理风险防范研究  

The Guarding Research of risk form Principal-agent Based on Asymmetric Information for Venture Capital

作　　者：马乐声[1] 汪波[1] 陈德棉[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《科学管理研究》2006年第3期106-109,共4页Scientific Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(79830030)

摘　　要：分析了在信息不对称条件下风险投资者与风险投资家、风险投资家与风险企业家之间双重委托代理关系,以及由此形成的逆向选择与道德风险问题。并从减小信息不对称程度和使委托代理双方利益趋向一致的角度出发,设计一系列风险防范对策。投资者与风险投资家之间的风险防范措施:形成市场声誉约束机制、合理设计风险投资家的报酬机制和行为约束机制;投资者与风险投资家之间的风险防范措施:严格的项目筛选、对风险企业进行尽职调查、分段投资、采取灵活多样的投资方式、对风险企业管理层实行股票期权、加强对风险企业的控制和监管。This paper analyses the diplex principal - agent relation between venture investor and capitalist, investor and enterpriser ,and analyses the problems of adverse selecting and moral hazard which result from the information asymmetry. To minish the information asymmetry degree and make consignor＇s and succedaneum＇s benefit more consistent, a series of countermeasures have been designed. The risk - guard measures for investor and capitalist： form the report mechanism, design valid reward and restriction mechanism; The risk- guard measures for investor and enterpriser; strict filtration for items, responsibility investigation to venture enterprises, phases investment, flexible investment mode; carrying out shares futures for venture administrators and effective supervise.

关 键 词：风险投资 信息不对称 委托代理 风险防范 逆向选择 约束机制 行为约束机制 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]