网络化制造中企业合作的博弈分析  

Game analysis on interfirm cooperation in networked manufacturing

作　　者：邓超[1] 邵新宇[1] 张毅[1] 翟瑞仁[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学机械科学与工程学院

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2006年第6期929-934,共6页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家863/CIMS主题资助项目(2003AA413110);塑性成形模拟及模具技术国家重点实验室开放基金资助项目(200402)~~

摘　　要：为了分析不同网络化制造模式对企业合作行为的影响,应用博弈理论研究了动态联盟和战略网络两种制造模式中企业合作的决策过程。构建了网络化制造中企业合作的博弈模型,分析了动态联盟中企业合作失败的原因,并相应提出了促进企业合作的改进措施。研究了战略网络中企业间的信任度问题,并得到了促使企业合作的信任度临界值,指出战略网络中企业重复合作和相互信任是企业间合作的重要基础。由于战略网络既不需要改变联盟协议的游戏规则,也不增加联盟管理成本就可以促进企业合作,相对于动态联盟而言是一种更有利的网络化制造模式。To analyze diversified influence of different networked manufacturing modes on firm cooperation, the decision- making procedures of interfirm cooperations both in dynamic alliance and in strategic network were studied by using game theory. A game model of interfirm cooperation in networked manufacturing was constructed. Reasons leading to failure in firm cooperation in dynamic alliance were analyzed and improvement measures to promote firm cooperation were also proposed. Meanwhile, the trust level of interfirm cooperation in strategic network was studied and a critical value leading to successful interfirm cooperation was achieved. It was also pointed that repeated cooperation and mutual trust in strategic network was essential for interfirm cooperation. As the strategic network had no need to change the game rule in networked manufacturing, or increase the cost of alliance management, it was regarded as a more favorable networked manufacturing mode for interfirm cooperation than dynamic alliance.

关 键 词：网络化制造 动态联盟 战略网络 企业间合作 博弈 

分 类 号：TH166[机械工程—机械制造及自动化]