公职人员从煤矿撤资行为的博弈分析  

Game analysis of the behavior of governmental officials'withdrawal from coal mines'capital

作　　者：刘杨[1] 屈晓娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710062

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（西部论坛）》2006年第3期102-104,共3页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:West Forum

摘　　要：公职人员在煤矿的参股行为和征管者的查处是相互制约和影响的,双方都在不断地收集信息来纠正自己的预期和决策行动,使得博弈结果偏离完全信息下的均衡状态;公职人员违规及查处都会导致社会资源的浪费,使得资源配置远离帕累托最优。应加大处罚力度,降低违规获利的诱惑力;严格执法,维护法律的尊严和征管者的信誉;并建立完善的监管者激励机制。Governmental officials＇ purchase of shares of coal mines and government departments＇ investigation and prosecution are interactive and influential with each other. Both parties continuously collect information to correct its own prediction and decision, which makes the game results deviate equilibrium state under full information condition. Governmental officials＇violation of discipline and its investigation and prosecution result in the wasting of social resources, which makes resources relocation deviate Pareto Optimality. The governments should impose bigger punishment, decrease the temptation of violated profit, strictly enforce the law, protect the dignity of the law and the reputation of prosecutors and establish incentive mechanism of prosecutors.

关 键 词：公职人员 撤资 煤矿 博弈 监管者 

分 类 号：F426.21[经济管理—产业经济] F224