农民工职业风险、工伤保险与教育补贴的政策效应  

Vocational Risks,Industrial Injury Insurance and Education Subsidies for Rural-Workers

作　　者：寇国明[1] 邱长溶[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《财经研究》2006年第7期18-28,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：农民工工伤保险和农民工教育补贴新政策引人瞩目。文章考虑两部门(农民工和政府)、两时期(教育投资期和工作期)经济,构造基于职业风险、并纳入新政策变量的效用函数,通过局部均衡和比较静态分析揭示新政策效应。结论表明:“理性选择”是农民工微观行为决策的特征雏型;农民工工伤保险制度实现了高、低风险职业福利的再分配;教育投资提升了社会效率,但均衡是帕累托次优状态;而农民工教育补贴政策的介入,则实现着帕累托改进的动态过程。农民工工伤保险和教育补贴政策的有机搭配,诠释着公平与效率并重的和谐政策艺术,动态支撑着公平与效率的平衡。The policies about industrial injury insurance and education subsidies for rural-workers have caught the eyes of the public. By the two sector and two period economic model, this paper constructs a utility function in which new policy variables and vocational risks are included. By partial equilibrium and comparative static state analysis, conclusions are as follows： rural-workers＇ behaviors are characterized by rational choices; welfare has been reallocated among high-risk and low-risk occupations with the help of the industrial injury insurance for rural-workers; education investment has improved the society efficiency, however, the equilibrium is a second-best Pareto state;Pareto improvement is processing when education subsidy enters the utility function as a variable. The organic combination of the policies about industrial injury insurance and education subsidies for rural-workers exhibits the art of harmonious polices,which emphasizes both fairness and efficiency, and simultaneously supports the balance between the two.

关 键 词：农民工工伤保险 农民工教育补贴 职业风险 政策效应 

分 类 号：F842.6[经济管理—保险] F840