不完全合同、退出的激励平衡和控制权转移  

Incomplete Contract,Incentive Equilibrium in the Exit of Venture Capital and the Control Transfer

作　　者：李金龙[1] 费方域[1] 谈毅[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《财经研究》2006年第7期134-143,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章针对创业资本退出时控制权转移问题,构建了基于不完全合同理论的分析框架。首先,文章在合同完全和不完全两种情况下分析了创业投资中的相机控制,得出这种制度安排的根源在于投资双方的激励不平衡的结论;其次,文章分五种情况具体探讨了控制权如何进行转移。A framework based on the incomplete contract theory is established in this paper so as to explore the issue of control transfer in the exit of venture capital. The paper firstly analyzes the discretionary mechanism in investment under the two different circumstances of complete and incomplete contract, getting the conclusion that such kind of system is resulted from the incentive disequilibrium between the investors, and then it examines the specific ways for transferring control right according to the five different situations.

关 键 词：创业资本 退出 不完全合同 激励平衡 控制权 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]