“产前性别鉴定”监管困境的博弈分析  

A Game Theory Analysis of the Difficulties in Supervision of Antenatal Fetus' Sex Selection

作　　者：钟庆才[1] 朱秀杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学科技与社会研究所,北京100084 [2]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《南方人口》2006年第3期4-10,25,共8页South China Population

摘　　要：“产前性别鉴定”监管中政府与医疗机构处于信息高度不对称状态,这将导致监管的困境;政府采取的一系列措施没有收到明显的效果。同时医疗机构与育龄妇女之间自动达成合作协议是导致信息不对称的关键。本文构建了“产前性别鉴定”监管的模型,利用博弈论的分析方法对造成“产前性别鉴定”监管困境的原因作出新的诠释,并提出摆脱困境的思路和相应对策建议。Though govemments have been taking many measures to deter the sex selection, few of these measures seems can practically work. One explanation is that the medical organizations＇ relevant information is highly asymmetric to the supervisors, another new explanation from the game theory is that the medical organizations and the pregnant woman conspire to prevent their fetus sex selection from being supervised. Based on the game mechanics analysis, the paper put forwards some suggestions to improve the supervision of fetus sex selection.

关 键 词：产前性别鉴定 监管困境 博弈分析 对策建议 政府 医疗机构 信息不对称 

分 类 号：C923[社会学—人口学]