模块性、经典计算和意向实在论——论福多思维非模块性论题的一个本体论后果  

Modularity,Classical Computation and Intentional Realism:an Ontological Implication of Fodor's Thesis of Nonmodularity of Thinking

作　　者：田平[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2006年第7期14-17,共4页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：福多将计算模块的概念运用于对心灵模块性的分析,提出心灵之负责输入分析的部分(感知觉系统、语言系统等)是模块性的,而心灵之专司信念的确立和思维之职的部分(中心系统)是非模块性的。由此,福多进一步得出心的计算理论不适用于中心系统的结论。然而,福多的结论给他的计算主义的意向实在论辩护带来了问题:如果思维不是计算,那么,福多关于常识心理学所持的意向实在论主张就成了空中楼阁。In his analysis of the modularity of mind, Fodor claims that the input systems of our cognition（such as perceptual and language systems）are modular, whereas the central systems that are responsible for belief fixation and thinking are nonmodular. As a consequence of this analysis, Fodor further concludes that the computational theory of mind is not applicable to central systems. However, Fodor＇ s conclusion raises problems for his intentional realist argument： if thinking is not computation, Fodor＇s intentional realism becomes a castle in the air.

关 键 词：心的模块性 思维的非模块性 心的计算理论 常识心理学 意向实在论 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]