从博弈视域下看交通法规监管与惩罚法规的选择  

The Choices of Traffic Law between Superintendence and Penalization from the View of Game Theory

作　　者：刘丽萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第4期94-96,共3页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：通过建立博弈模型系统,阐明了交通相应的制度建设来约束公民遵守法规,从而减少交通事故发生率的解决思路,同时从理论上证明这一思路较之目前交通法规的优越性。The article demonstrates a view on solving the problem by building a game theory model.The main idea is that we should restrict the citizen＇s movement by way of a series of policy in order to reduce the incidence of traffic accidences.At the same tlme,the article proves theoretically that the view is better than the current traffic law.

关 键 词：公民 执法者 博弈论 模型 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]