非对称信息条件下风险投资者与多个风险投资家的委托——代理分析  

The Principal-agent Relationship Between Venture Investors and Venture Capitalists With Asymmetric Information

作　　者：赵坤[1] 王栋[2] 孙锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021 [2]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221008

出　　处：《商业研究》2006年第14期4-7,共4页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:40271054

摘　　要：风险投资者与多个风险投资家建立合同关系,多个风险投资家共同为该投资者经营一个风险投资项目,易导致搭便车行为。在连续支付模式下,引入有效的激励机制能够提高各风险投资家努力的积极性,提高项目的投资效率和成功率。通过对风险投资者与多个风险投资家之间委托-代理关系的进一步分析可知,在连续基金周期中,各风险投资家只有充分地发挥自己的努力水平,才能达到一个马尔科夫完美均衡(MPE)。Venture investors and venture capitalists establish the contract relationship. Since many venture capitalists operate one risk investment item for venture investors, it may fail to bring evey one into full play. In the mode of continual compensation, the introduction of effective incentive mechanism can improve venture capitallsts＇initiative as well as investment efficiency and project success ratio project. Through the further analysis of the principal -agent relationship between venture investors and venture capitalists, the paper finds that in the consecution fund period only venture capitalists get themselves devoted to investment project can they attain to Markov perfect equilibrium.

关 键 词：风险投资者 风险投资家 委托代理 马尔科夫完美均衡 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]