农地制度:所有权问题还是委托-代理问题?  

Collective Ownership of Rural Land:Tenure or Principal-Agent Problem

作　　者：陈剑波[1] 

机构地区：[1]国务院发展研究中心农村部

出　　处：《经济研究》2006年第7期83-91,共9页Economic Research Journal

摘　　要：村委会作为农村基层唯一合乎法定体制的正规制度安排,承担着政府代理人、集体产权代理人、社区管理者相互矛盾冲突的三项职能。这一制度设计缺陷,引发了对土地集体所有、家庭经营制度的深入探讨。本文通过对土地职能、村委会角色与职能冲突及集体所有制问题的讨论,提出了土地集体所有家庭经营制度的治理结构问题,认为集体所有是均分土地的基本前提,而土地均分又是保障“人人有饭吃”的制度基础。在社会保障制度不完善的条件下,土地集体所有是既有的现实选择,这就使集体所有治理结构中存在的委托—代理关系,随着农户经济结构的转型正成为农村改革与发展面临的新问题。Villager council as the unique legitimate and formal institution arrangement takes three functions conflicting： the agent of local government, agent of collective ownership and governor of village community. The multi-functions conflicting each other that villager council has taken are bringing various doubts and blame on rural fundamental institutional arrangement-Household Responsibility System under collective ownership. This article discussed the relationship among functions of land, conflicting three roles of villager council and collective ownership. It raised the issue of governing structure of collective ownership. The paper conclude that collective ownership of land is the important precondition for land equally distribution to community member, and averagely distribution of land is the fundamental institution design to ensure everyone can labor for bread. When social insurance mechanism is imperfect and the institutional framework of collective ownership is unchangeable in short term, governing structure of collective ownership is becoming a new problem for rural reform and development while farming economy is transforming from traditional small farmer into part time farmer.

关 键 词：土地集体所有 治理结构 村民委员会职能 土地职能 委托—代理冲突 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]