四类拍卖的收益等价性研究  

Research of Revenue Equivalence of Four Kinds of Auctions

作　　者：乔恒[1] 邱菀华[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2006年第7期118-123,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项基金(200159);航空科学预研基金(03J51057);国家自然科学基金(7037201170401004)

摘　　要：在收益等价性及应用的完整框架下对四类拍卖的收益等价性问题进行了总结、研究和探讨.在对收益等价定理进行推论和应用的基础上,确认了SIPV(对称、独立、私人价值)假设下四种拍卖期望收益与期望支付的等价性,推导了二价全支付拍卖的均衡竞价策略.在此基础上比较并解释了SIPV假设下四种拍卖均衡报价的排序关系.总结,比较并解释了关联价值假设下四种拍卖的期望收益的排序关系.指出不同的信息结构设定是影响不同假设下拍卖收益等价性和不同假设拍卖模型对经济现象解释能力的关键因素.最后,展望了拍卖收益等价问题的新的发展方向.Summarization, research, and discussion of four kinds of auction forms are executed under the framework of the revenue equivalence and it applications. Based on the deductions and applications of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem under the SIPV assumption, expected revenue and expected payment of the four kinds of auctions are confirmed to be equivalent, and the equilibrium bidding strategy of the second-price all-pay auction is derived. Then the equilibrium bids of the four kinds of auctions are ranked and explained. Additionally, under signal-affiliated assumption the expected revenue of the four kinds of auctions are ranked and explained. It is concluded that different informational environment settings are crucial to the different results of revenue equivalence of auction forms and lead to different explanation abilities of auction models under different assumptions. Finally, new developments of revenue equivalence of auctions are reviewed and prospected.

关 键 词：收益等价 全支付拍卖 拍卖 

分 类 号：F2[经济管理—国民经济]