内生溢出与R&D竞争、合作的激励问题  

Endogenous Spillovers and the Incentive Problem on R&D Competition or Cooperation

作　　者：刘卫民[1] 陈继祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2006年第3期1-5,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371043)

摘　　要：在AJ模型的基础上,将技术溢出率作为内生变量。当政府采用平衡预算后,企业依次决定均衡R&D水平、溢出率和产量。如果企业共同决定R&D水平和外溢率,则可以避免技术共享中的“囚徒困境”问题。但是,在创新组织的选择中,社会福利与企业利润之间存在矛盾。Based on AJ model, technology spiUovers were considered as endogenous parameter. After government adopted the balancedbudget, firms determined the equilibrium solutions of R＆D level, spiUover rate and output in turn. If firms select R＆D level and spiUovers jointly, Prisoners＇ Dilemma in technology sharing is avoided. However, there is conflict between social welfare and firm profit.

关 键 词：研究与开发 内生溢出 补贴 合作 竞争 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]