WTO框架下保障措施经济学:以钢铁产品案为例  

The Economics of Safeguards under the WTO: A Case Study of the Steel Industry

作　　者：严建苗[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院国际经济与贸易学系

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2006年第7期65-71,共7页World Economics and Politics

摘　　要：保障措施是WTO框架下与反倾销、反补贴相并列的保护国内产业的贸易救济工具。作者认为经济扭曲理论是实施保障措施的贸易保护政策依据;鼓励产生外部利益和垄断租金的产业发展,为保障措施手段的实施提供了新理论解释;缓解国际和国内政治压力,则体现了保障措施新政治经济学视角的政策功能。作者以钢铁产品保障措施为例,对文章建立的理论分析框架进行验验证,并为中国运用保障措施政策工具提出相应的建议。Safeguards are a trade-protecting tool to protect domestic industries under the framework of the WTO, parallel to the anti-dumping and countervailing measures. Domestic market distortions are the theoretical basis for implementation of a trade-protection policy, which encourages the development of industries that produce external interests and mono￣poly rents and can provide a new theoretical explanation for the implementation of safeguards. From the perspective of the new political economy, these safeguards have served to alleviate political pressures at home and abroad. Based on a case study of the steel industry, the author conducts an empirical test of the theoretical framework of this paper and attempts to offer policy suggestions for China.

关 键 词：WTO 保障措施 国内产业 钢铁产品 

分 类 号：F752.6[经济管理—国际贸易]