建筑节能激励政策的非对称博弈分析  

Asymmetric Game Analysis of Incentive Policy to Buildings Energy Efficiency

作　　者：徐江[1] 刘应宗[1] 尤爱军[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学,天津300072 [2]中国银行河南省分行,郑州450008

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2006年第3期9-12,共4页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：本文探讨了建筑节能领域中政府与房地产商群体之间的非对称博弈问题,分析了该博弈所具有的模仿者动态模型、斯坦克尔伯格模型的特点,并构造了两者关于建筑节能激励政策的非对称博弈模型,最后对双方分别提出了博弈策略建议。From the bounded rationality of players, an asymmetric game between the colony players of land agents and the government is discussed in the domain of energy efficiency in buildings. The game model has been built which has the characteristics of replicator dynamic model and stackelberg model. In the end, the economic policy for the game players is put forward.

关 键 词：建筑节能 非对称博弈 模仿者动态模型 斯坦克尔伯格模型 

分 类 号：F014.36[经济管理—政治经济学]