基于事故赔偿的电网监管机制分析  

Mechanism of Electricity Network Supervision Based on Accident Compensation

作　　者：刘昌臣[1] 李艳[2] 王镜宇 罗云峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学控制科学与工程系,湖北武汉430074 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《武汉科技大学学报》2006年第4期383-384,397,共3页Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60074033)

摘　　要：研究电力市场环境下的电网监管激励机制,认为监管机构可以采取事故惩罚机制,以激励电网运营商投入足够的电网管理费用来确保电网的安全稳定运行。讨论输电电价和运营商的风险类型之间的关系以及特定情况下的事故惩罚力度的确定问题。The paper studies the incentive mechanism of network supervision in the environment of electricity market and concludes that, to make electricity network run efficiently and safely, the supervision body can introduce an accident-punishing mechanism to guarantee more investment on network management. The paper also discusses the relationship between the price of power transmission and the risk-types of operator as well as the accident punishment in special situations.

关 键 词：事故赔偿 监管机制 电力市场 

分 类 号：F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]