当量定价机制下发电商的产量决策分析与比较  

Capacity decision of power supplier with electricity value equivalent pricing method

作　　者：李玉平[1] 李晓刚[2] 言茂松[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学经济系,上海201800 [2]华东电力培训中心,上海200438 [3]上海大学自动化系,上海200072

出　　处：《电力自动化设备》2006年第9期12-15,共4页Electric Power Automation Equipment

摘　　要：分析了当量定价机制下发电商的最优产量决策,比较了当量电价、统一出清和按报价支付3种定价机制对发电商的产量决策的激励作用。指出在统一出清和按报价支付定价机制下,发电商会通过持留行为滥用市场力,而在当量电价下,尤其在缺电情况下,发电商的最优产量决策仍然是申报其最大可用容量,而不是持留发电容量。当量定价方法激励发电商申报全部容量的机制,可以保证电力市场的充裕容量,从而实现了电价乃至市场的稳健性。A study on optimal capacity decision of power suppliers with EVE （Electricity Value Equivalent） method is presented. Incentive mechanisms of pay-as-bid pricing method,uniform clearing pricing method and EVE pricing method are compared. With the uniform cleating pricing method and the pay-as-bid pricing method,the power supplier abuses market power by withholding action,but with the EVE pricing method,especially when there is no sufficient electricity,the optimal capacity decision of the power supplier is to submit his maximum available capacity without any withholding capacity. With the EVE pricing method,the abundant capacity of the power market can be ensured,thus stable and robust market and price are realized.

关 键 词：电力市场 报价策略 持留 统一出清电价 当量电价 

分 类 号：F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]