公共利益的博弈与中国的选择  

Public Welfare Game and the Choice of China

作　　者：赵思思[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北大学,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《山东省农业管理干部学院学报》2006年第5期107-108,共2页Journal of Shandong Agricultural Administrators' College

摘　　要：中国的法律制度和世界贸易组织的规则安排各有自已的逻辑起点。入世后,如果二者相和,则有利于双赢的达成;如果逻辑起点相左,则冲突不断。本文从对公共利益的界定入手,以博弈论的囚徒困境理论为基础,假设了中国行政法制度安排与WTO规则二者的公益基础的四次博弈,并提出了中国的最佳选择以及实施策略。Logic arrangements of China’s legal system and the rules of the World Trade Organization have their own starting point. Upon joining the WTO, and if they are harmonious, it is conducive to win-win; If the logic of starting our viewpoints are in conflict, the conflicts continue. Based on prisoners plight theory of game theory, This article assumes four game of welfare arrangements of Chinese administrative system with WTO rules, and put forward the best choice and the implementation strategy of China.

关 键 词：公共利益 WTO规则 行政法制度 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]