排污申报控制方式的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Control Modes in Emission Declaration

作　　者：吴亚琼[1] 岳超源[2] 赵勇[2] 吴相林[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京化工大学信息科学与技术学院,北京100029 [2]华中科技大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2006年第8期81-85,共5页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70471077);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20020487046);湖北省自然科学基金(2002AB082)

摘　　要：污染物排放总量控制是当前我国遏制环境污染的重要手段,其基础是初始排污权的合理分配,其中按比例分配法配合排污申报制度是管理部门目前采取的主要方法.该方法的采用带来了管理部门和企业之间在排污信息不对称情况下的动态博弈行为.在该博弈中,有两种控制方式可供管理部门选择,即控制排污削减总量和控制允许排污总量.Stackelberg模型是经典的完全信息动态博弈模型,基于该模型对两种控制方式下的博弈行为进行了建模和分析.以此为基础,侧重在政策的动态一致性方面,对两种控制方式进行了比较,结果是,在管理部门有信誉的情况下,前者一般不具有动态一致性,而后者总具有动态一致性,从而得出了后者优于前者的结论.This paper explores two control modes of emission declaration based on the dynamic game behavior between the regulator and the firms with asymmetry information of emission quantity. In practice, the regulator always allocates the emission permits to some extent in propertion to the emission quantity that the firms declare in China. However the firms always do not believe the regulator, for the policy is not dynamic consistent sometimes. On the other hand, there are two control modes to be chosen for the regulator, one of which is to control the total quantity of the emission that should be cut, and the other is to control the total quantity of the emission. We therefore develop a model based on Stackelberg dynamic model to analyze and compare the game behavior between the regulator and the firms under the two modes. We find that when the regulator is honest, the former isn＇t dynamic consistent in general while the hitter is dynamic consistent. So the hitter is better than the former in concern with dynamic consistency.

关 键 词：污染物排放总量控制 初始排污权分配 排污申报 Stackelberg动态博弈模型 动态一致性 

分 类 号：F062[经济管理—政治经济学]