在位创新厂商对潜在进入者的专利许可研究  

Technology Licensing to Potential Entrants by Incumbent Firms

作　　者：郭红珍[1] 闫庆友[1] 黄文杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2006年第8期89-96,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：通过研究技术市场竞争性对创新者许可激励的影响,为在位创新厂商确定对潜在进入者的固定费用许可策略提供理论指导.首先利用消费者效用函数推导出在位创新厂商向潜在进入者发放许可时的差异C ournot寡占均衡一般式.然后,利用特定寡占均衡,研究多个对称创新厂商(技术市场存在竞争)与唯一创新厂商(技术市场无竞争)向潜在进入者发放许可的最优策略.着重分析了产品替代系数、厂商数量与知识可占有程度对创新者许可策略的影响.结果表明:在技术市场竞争压力下,多家对称创新厂商的最优策略是不向潜在进入者发放许可;而唯一创新厂商的均衡许可数量与知识可占有程度、产品替代系数以及在位厂商的数量成正比与交易费用成反比.The purpose of the present paper is to give suggestion for incumbent producer innovator by examining how competition among technology holders in both product market and technology market affects their incentives to issue fixed-fee licenses to potential entrants. Two separate cases in a differentiated Cournot structure, a monopolist patentee and multiple symmetric patentees, are considered on the basis of whether or not the patentee faces competition pressure of technology market. And the determination of the optimal license number of patentee（s） is solved explicitly. The results show that no licensing is the preferred option of each of multiple symmetric patentees. However, for a monopolist patentee, its licensing incentive is increasing in both the number of incumbent competitors and the substitution coefficient of product.

关 键 词：博弈论 Cournot寡占竞争 固定费用许可 

分 类 号：G306[文化科学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]