土地出让市场的博弈分析:利益背景与政府行为过程  

Game Analysis of Urban Wholesale Lease Land Market:Benefit Motives and governmental Action Process

作　　者：周滔[1] 杨庆媛[2] 丰雷[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学土地管理系,北京100872 [2]西南大学地理科学学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2006年第4期18-23,共6页China Land Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金应急研究项目(70341020)

摘　　要：研究目的:建立土地出让市场监管博弈模型,分析监管部门和出让部门的混合策略选择,提出完善土地出让市场监管的有效制度安排。研究方法:博弈分析。研究结果:(1)出让部门违规的动因来源于其行为所产生的远超出正常行为的得益以及违规行为被查处后所受的损失与其违规收益的机会成本考量;(2)监管部门的监管绩效取决于激励及约束机制的侧重点及其效率。研究结论:完善土地出让市场的着力点在于对监管部门和出让部门的行为空间与利益空间的规制,同时应进行相应的经济及行政体制改革。The purpose of the paper is to establish a game model for analyzing hybrid strategy of supervising department and land wholesale lease department in urban land market, and to put forward the institutional arrangement for improving land market working. Method of game analysis was employed. The result show that： （1） Tremendous benefit and relative low opportunity cost of illegal actions are the main factors determining behavior choice of land wholesale lease department; （2） The emphasis and efficiency of incentive mechanism determine the performance of supervision department. It is concluded that the key to improve urban wholesale lease land market is to regulate the action scope and benefit opportunity of the supervising department and the land wholesale lease department.

关 键 词：博弈论 土地出让市场 利益背景 政府行为 

分 类 号：F301.1[经济管理—产业经济]