Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis on Financing Strategy and Product Differentiation Strategy in the Frame of Bertrand Competition

作　　者：杨广青[1] 蒋录全[1] 王浣尘[1] 陈明义[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2006年第4期88-94,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(79870052);上海市科技发展基金软科学研究博士生论文资助项目

摘　　要：融资策略与产品差异化策略是企业两大重要的决策。本文通过构造一个纵向产品差异化的三阶段动态博弈模型,研究了不确定环境下,企业债务融资对产品差异化策略和定价策略的影响,并与不存在债务策略下的均衡结果进行了比较。研究表明,负债情形下,企业的均衡质量和均衡价格均高于无负债下的质量和价格,产品纵向差异度低于无负债下的差异度,且负债水平越高,企业的均衡质量、均衡价格和均衡利润越高,企业间的产品纵向差异度也越高。The financing strategy and product differentiation strategy both are important basic decisions. In a three-stage dynamic game model based on vertical product differentiation, the article studies that enterprise＇s debt financing strategy imposes effect on product differentiation strategy and pricing decision under uncertainty, at the same time, we compare competition equilibrium outcomes with that under non- debt financing. The research shows that under debt financing, equilibrium quality and equilibrium price are higher, the degree of vertical product differentiation is lower, also the higher debt level is, the higher the enterprise＇s equilibrium quality, equilibrium price, equilibrium profit and the degree of vertical product differentiation are.

关 键 词：债务融资 纵向产品差异化 伯川德竞争 不确定性 

分 类 号：F223[经济管理—国民经济]