分税制改革、地方政府干预与金融发展效率  

Tax Sharing Reform,Governmental Intervention and the Efficiency of Financial Development

作　　者：尹希果[1] 陈刚[1] 潘杨[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《财经研究》2006年第10期92-101,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章对1994年的分税制改革在改变中央与地方政府财政收支格局的同时,是否使地方政府施加于金融部门的行为方式也趋于变化作了系统考察。研究显示,正是由于分税制改革切断了财政收入与支出的联系,使得地方政府面临着沉重的财政负担,从而导致了其普遍加强了对金融信贷行为的干预,不利于金融部门发挥其价值发现与企业监管的职能,进而也必然导致金融信贷资金配置的低效率。计量分析结果也有力地支持了上述观点,其政策含义是将财政体制、金融体制和政府体制改革纳入同一个框架中将有利于减少制度转型过程中的“摩擦成本”。This paper is focused on whether local government＇s behavior on financial intermediations has changed after tax sharing reform in 1994. We take for that because of the separation of local government＇s fiscal income and expenditure. The local government is faced with heavy fiscal load, which gives rise to its intervention to local financial intermediations. Furthermore, local government＇s intervention brings about the inefficiency of financial intermediation＇s credits. The empirical analysis convincingly supports the views above. The study indicates that taking finance, fiscal, and government systems into a uniformly reformational framework could reduce the friction costs of institutional transition.

关 键 词：分税制改革 政府干预 金融发展 

分 类 号：F810.422[经济管理—财政学]