物流合作中最优专用性投资的激励契约设计  

The Incentive Contract Design for Optimization Specific Investment in Logistics Cooperation

作　　者：余小川[1] 季建华[1] 邵晓峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2006年第9期1605-1609,共5页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金重点资助项目(O2JAZ79007);国家自然科学资金资助项目(70402005)

摘　　要：在物流合作中针对企业物流的具体需求特征而进行的专用性投资,能够显著提高物流服务的质量,从而可以减少间接物流成本.但是由于专用性投资引起的套牢问题,导致合作中专用性投资不足.通过建立数学模型研究激励合作方进行最优专用性投资的契约机制设计问题,并通过契约机制设计解决了套牢问题对合作中专用性投资的影响.In order to improve the service quality of the logistics cooperation and to reduce the logistics costs, the cooperation contract should have the mechanism to encourage specific investment. Because the hold-up problem aroused by specific investment makes the agent of under-investment, this paper established a quantity model to study the optimization of the incentive contract in logistics cooperation. The influence of hold-up problem to the specific investment and the solution of the problem were studied also.

关 键 词：物流合作 专用性投资 套牢 契约设计 

分 类 号：F091.3[经济管理—政治经济学]