基于VC谈判力的内生投资模型  

The Endo-model Based on Bargaining Power of VC

作　　者：李金龙[1] 谈毅[1] 范纯增[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2006年第9期76-80,共5页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：近来,对风险投资的研究大都是从信息不对称、控制权的私有收益的角度出发,并且把首次投资水平看成是外生决定的变量.把其内生化并从谈判力的视角出发建立了一个两期信号博弈模型.通过模型分析,①得到了影响首次投资水平的关键因素:投资双方的谈判力、双方信息不对称以及事后不确定性程度;②对相关因素进行了量化分析,并讨论了投资双方谈判力的分配问题.Recently, most research on the Venture Capital comes from asymmetry information, or the benefits of control rights. More ever, the initial investment level is taken as given. Now this is endogenous and a two-period model based on the sight of bargaining power is constructed in the paper. With the analysis on the model, some conclusions are given. Firstly, the key factors on the initial investment level are given; Secondly, the bargaining power between two sides, asymmetry information and post-uncertainty are analysis in quantity, hesides, the allocation of the bargaining power is discussed in the paper.

关 键 词：风险投资 信号博弈模型 谈判权力 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]