基于合作博弈的企业分配理论  

Firms Distribution Theory Based on Cooperative Game

作　　者：徐幼民[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《湖南大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第5期73-78,共6页Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：如果生产要素与产出之间的关系是非连续的,按照边际生产力理论进行分配难以满足完备性的条件,并且边际生产力没有考虑到群体理性的存在。如果将企业视为合作博弈的组织,并考虑到群体理性和离散条件,按照合作博弈的夏普莱值进行分配则能够满足个体理性和完备性条件,也可以对现实中企业经济利润的来源和社会中劳动收入之间的巨大差异给予更为合理的解释。If the relation between factors of production and outputs is discrete, it is difficult for the distribution, based on the marginal productivity theory, to meet the completeness conditions, and the marginal productivity does consider the existence of group rationality. If taken the firms as the organization of cooperative game and taken the group rationality and discrete conditions into consideration, the distribution, based on the Shapley value of cooperative game, can meet the individual rationality and completeness conditions, and can give a more reasonable interpretation on the sources of the real firms＇ economic profits and the great differences between aggregate social labor incomes.

关 键 词：企业 分配理论 合作博弈 

分 类 号：F046[经济管理—政治经济学]