基于促销投资的非对称信息供应链契约研究  

Asymmetric Information Supply Chain Contract Based on Promotion Investment

作　　者：薛丽达[1] 吕弘善 王敬勇[3] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院会计学院,江苏南京210029 [2]牡丹江市审计局,黑龙江牡丹江157000 [3]中国矿业大学(北京)管理与工程学院,北京100081

出　　处：《商业研究》2006年第19期39-42,共4页Commercial Research

摘　　要：利用了委托代理理论和最优控制理论,分析对称信息和不对称信息两种情况下制造商和零售商的供应链契约。零售商进行促销投资,在对称信息情况下,制造商以批发价作为线性契约来协调供应链系统,批发价是促销投资的减函数;在非对称信息情况下,制造商以批发价和补贴作为非线性契约的协调机制,而批发价和补贴都是促销投资的增函数。According to principal- agent theory and optimal control theory, the contract of manufacturer and retailer supply chain is analyzed with symmetric information and asymmetric information. Wholesaling price decreasing demand promotion function is taken as linear contract to coordinate supply chain by manufacturer under symmetric information. As the coordination mechanism of nonlinear contract, both wholesaling price and price subsidies can increase demand promotion functions.

关 键 词：非对称信息 供应链契约 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]