我国基金托管人监督职责问题研究  

A Study on Supervision Responsibility of Chinese Trust Custodian

作　　者：张广兴[1] 李强[2] 王新玉[3] 

机构地区：[1]河北师范大学商学院,河北石家庄050091 [2]中共中央党校经济学部,北京100091 [3]首都经济贸易大学金融系,北京100026

出　　处：《商业研究》2006年第19期72-75,共4页Commercial Research

摘　　要：我国《证券投资基金法》规定:基金托管人负有保管和监督双重职责。但由于基金托管人和基金管理人具有共同利益,从博弈数量模型看他们可能形成合谋,损害投资者利益;同时信托契约设计上的缺陷以及托管人实际操作中的无能为力,使托管人监督不力。因此,要从法律上建立对托管人及管理人的激励机制而非法律严惩;从信托契约上完善受托人机制以及借鉴公司型基金。Security investment trust fund law regulates that the custodian should, undertake dual- responsibility, that is, safekeeping, and supervising Since the custodion and the manager have the commont interest, they may conspire to do harm to investors in view of the game theory econometrics model. And the defect in the design of trust contract and the incapacity in factual dealings make the custodian malfuntion in case of supervision. It is vital to estabish the restrictive mechanism, though not by law purishmen. It is also necessary to consummate entrusted mechanism and benefit form the corporation fund prectice.

关 键 词：托管人 合谋 信托契约 基金托管人 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]