R&D专用投资和风险共担的不完全契约分析  

Specific Investment and Risk Sharing Analysis of R&D Incomplete Contract

作　　者：马扬[1] 顾广彩[2] 华武[3] 陈刚 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院院士工作局,北京100864 [2]中国科技大学商学院,安徽合肥230026 [3]兴业银行研究规划部,福建福州350000 [4]中原证券投资部,上海200000

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2006年第10期5-10,共6页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

摘　　要：采用不完全契约分析的思想,分析了我国企业和科研机构R&D最优契约的设计问题,构建了R&D契约模型,并分析了在双方专用性投资和研发风险共担条件下的契约特性,得出了在简单契约设计下可获得有效的关系专用性投资结果,并能减轻由契约不完全性导致的无效率。Using Incomplete Contract Theory, this article wants to analysis the first-best R＆D contract design between firm and scientific research unit in China. Through the R＆D model constructing, we analysis the characteristic of contract under specific： investment and risk sharing, and follow the result that the simple contract can induces efficient investment, and mitigates no efficiency from contract incompleteness.

关 键 词：专用性投资 风险共担 不完全契约 R 

分 类 号：G311[文化科学]