用户自备分布式发电与供电商的博弈  

Gaining Between Customer Invested DG and DISCO in Pool-based Electricity Markets

作　　者：胡庶[1] 吴耀武[1] 娄素华[1] 熊信艮[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学电气与电子工程学院,湖北省武汉市430074

出　　处：《电力系统自动化》2006年第20期21-25,共5页Automation of Electric Power Systems

摘　　要：随着越来越多的用户选择自给自足的分布式供能方式,电力市场条件下用户自备分布式发电(DG)与供电商的经济冲突成为亟待研究的问题。基于此,文中重点分析了仅考虑用户利益的DG规划对DG的推广发展所产生的负面影响,建立了以双方年效益为效用函数的博弈模型,并结合联营电力市场中电价理论给出以市场出清电价为核心的利益分配模式,用以解决双方的冲突。为证明该模式的有效性,根据1999年加州电力市场电价数据,给出规划某商业用户自备DG的博弈过程及结果。从结果看,在该利益分配模式下,可以实现用户DG、供电商、社会三方共赢。With the growing usage of distributed generation （DG） units, which are invested and established by customer, the conflict between customer invested DG and electric utility distribution company （DISCO） must be studied. This paper deduces DISCO＇s possible reaction, which is negative to the utilization of DG, if only the customer＇s profit is considered. Then a game model for analyzing the strategic behavior is presented, the annul expenses based utility functions of both sides are also deduced. In order to solve this conflict, based on the market clearing price （MCP）, a profit partition mode is established. Applying this mode into a planning procedure of customer invested DG, the profits of DG and DISCO are determined by the MCP of 1999 in California. The results show that under certain condition, both sides achieve the respective maximum profit and the considerable benefit of DG is also brought to the whole society.

关 键 词：分布式发电 博弈论 市场出清电价 电力市场 

分 类 号：TM61[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F407.61[经济管理—产业经济]