外资金融机构对中国国有商业银行收购定价的博弈分析  

Game-Theoretical Analysis of Foreign Financial Institutions' Acquisition for Chinese Commercial Banks

作　　者：周开国[1] 徐萌[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2006年第5期25-30,共6页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

摘　　要：研究表明,当商业银行经营状况好,无论是否具有高的附加价值,在知道外资金融机构的收购概率时,商业银行的最优选择应以高价售股。当商业银行经营状况差,但附加价值高,并且清楚知道外资金融机构的收购概率时,商业银行的最优选择是以高价出售。当商业银行经营状况差,附加价值低,并且清楚知道外资金融机构的收购概率时,商业银行的最优选择是以低价出售。Currently, how to make a reasonable price in the banking equity acquisition becomes the focus in the financial field in China. By using game theoretical analysis, this paper tries to devise the optimal strategy for all players in the process of foreign financial institutions＇ acquisition for domestic commercial banks, in a framework of incomplete information dynamic game. The results show that, when commercial banks are profitably operated, regardless of whether they have a high additional value, the optimal choice for domestic banks is to sell their equities at a high price, under the condition that they know the probability of being purchased. The case is the same with banks that are badly operated but with a high additional value. However, when facing the situation that the bank is badly operated with a low additional value, the optimal strategy for such a bank is to sell their equity in a low price, under the condition that they know the probability of being purchased.

关 键 词：股权收购 博弈论 股权溢价 附加价值 外资金融机构 中国 国有商业银行 收购定价 

分 类 号：F831.6[经济管理—金融学] F832.33