Fault Attack on the Balanced Shrinking Generator  

作　　者：GAO Juntao LI Xuelian HU Yupu 

机构地区：[1]Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Xidian University, Xi＇an 710071, Shaanxi, China [2]Department of Applied Mathematies, Xidian University, Xi＇an 710071, Shaanxi, China

出　　处：《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》2006年第6期1773-1776,共4页武汉大学学报（自然科学英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the Foundation of National Labora-tory for Modern Communications (51436030105DZ0105)

摘　　要：Fault analysis, belonging to indirect attack, is a cryptanalysis technique for the physical implementation of cryptosystem. In this paper, we propose a fault attack on the Balanced Shrinking Generator. The results show that the attacker can obtain the secret key by analyzing faulty output sequences which is produced by changing control clock of one of Linear Feedback Shift Registers （LFSR）. Therefore, the balanced shrinking generator has a trouble in hardware implementation.Fault analysis, belonging to indirect attack, is a cryptanalysis technique for the physical implementation of cryptosystem. In this paper, we propose a fault attack on the Balanced Shrinking Generator. The results show that the attacker can obtain the secret key by analyzing faulty output sequences which is produced by changing control clock of one of Linear Feedback Shift Registers （LFSR）. Therefore, the balanced shrinking generator has a trouble in hardware implementation.

关 键 词：stream cipher CRYPTANALYSIS fault attack balanced shrinking generator 

分 类 号：TN918.1[电子电信—通信与信息系统]