双寡头战略期权执行博弈均衡投资决策研究  

Equilibrium Investment Decision for Duopoly Strategic Option Game

作　　者：余冬平[1] 邱菀华[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2006年第4期5-8,共4页Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics：Social Sciences edition Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372011);高校博士点专项科研基金资助项目(20030006009)

摘　　要：运用期权博弈方法,研究了企业最优战略投资决策问题。在产品市场需求和运营成本二重不确定性因素假设条件下,给出企业投资价值函数和最优投资临界值,深入分析了企业最优均衡投资策略规则,探讨了不确定因素波动率及其相关性对企业最优投资临界值及均衡的影响,并通过数值释例研究了投资时机的可达性问题,以进一步验证和充实理论分析结果。Adopting the theory of option games, the article explores the issue co the optimal strategic investment decision for enterprises, providing that market demand for products and operation cost are contingent, The article, then, makes a thorough analysis of the rules for enterprises＇ making optimal equilibrium investment decsion and discusses the influence of factor volatility on and its correlation with critical value of optimal investment and equilibrium. The analytical resuh is further verified and enriched by a numerical example in which the issue of investment time is dealt with.

关 键 词：投资决策 实物期权 期权博弈 双头垄断 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]