下游差异Cournot厂商的提成许可策略与创新激励  

Licensing Strategy and Innovation Incentive of Downstream Cournot Firm

作　　者：郭红珍[1] 陈晓良[1] 黄文杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2006年第5期138-142,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：不同的上游市场结构对下游厂商的许可策略、创新激励产生不同的影响。文章分别基于上游原料供应商为独占垄断、双头垄断以及完全竞争的假设,结合提成许可策略,比较分析了下游产品市场差异Cournot厂商的创新激励。结果表明:上游厂商的市场势力越强,下游厂商的显著创新激励越低,但显著创新的提成许可激励却越高。这一结果为厂商与政府的创新管理提供了理论依据。Market structure in the upstream industry affects the licensing strategy and innovation incentive of downstream firms. The innovation incentive of downstream firms in a differentiated Cournot duopoly model are examined under three respective assumptions that the upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly or perfect competition. It is showed that the stronger the market power of the input supplier is, the lower the incentive of the downstream firms to win drastic innovation, but the higher the propensity of the downstream innovator to license out its drastic innovation by means of a royalty. This result provides the theoretical basis for innova- tion management of the firms and the government.

关 键 词：运筹学 创新激励 博弈论 提成许可策略 差异Cournot双头垄断 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]