有限信息与假冒伪劣商品的识别  

The Limited Information and the Distinction of Counterfeit and Shoddy Products

作　　者：孙毅[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济信息系,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2006年第11期13-19,共7页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

摘　　要：基本竞争模型完全信息的假设与现实相悖:由于信息的真伪难辨;信息收集需要成本;消费者能够记忆并回想的信息有限;消费者对信息的加工能力有限以及信息市场不完善等原因,致使消费者所掌握的信息非常有限。信息有限的结果是市场稀薄和假冒伪劣商品盛行。消费者可以借助担保、信誉、专家、标准以及价格制度等方法去识别假冒伪劣商品。The perfect information assumption of basic competition model contradicts the reality： the information＇s undistinguishable features, the demanded costs for the information gathering, the limited information that can be memorized and recalled, the limited information process capacity, the information market imperfection and such all result in the very limited information that the consumers can grasp. Its outcome is the dull market and the popularity of counterfeit and shoddy products. Consumers can distinguish those products by means of warranty, credit standing, experts, standards, price system and the like.

关 键 词：假冒伪劣商品 有限信息 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]