A Study of China＇s Decision-making Process in Relation to the Ceasefire Negotiations during the Korean War  

抗美援朝战争中的停战谈判决策研究

作　　者：Niu Jun Zhang Dachuan(Translated ) 

机构地区：[1]School of International Studies, Peking University [2]不详

出　　处：《Social Sciences in China》2006年第4期96-108,共13页中国社会科学（英文版）

摘　　要：The ＂decision-making process behind the ceasefire negotiations＂ studied in this article refers to the decision by top Chinese leaders to accept the US proposal for truce talks after the Chinese People＇s Volunteers launched their fifth campaign against U.S. led international troops in the summer of 1951. China＇s leaders had gone through an unusual series of decision-making processes from the decision to send troops in early October 1950 to their decision to hold ceasefire talks with the United States in June 1951. The latter decision was of great significance. Judging from the way in which the situation later developed, it was around June 1951 that the basic dispositions in the contest between China and the United States in Korea stabilized, though the ceasefire negotiations lasted two years. Despite repeated battles, large and small, in these two years,the center of military conflict between the two warring parties remained around the 38^th parallel.自中国人民志愿军发起第一次战役后，除了以积极防御为主要特点的第四次战役外，其他几次战役都伴随着对停战谈判的考虑，有关停战的设想和条件不断变化，而且每次都涉及战役目标与军事战略之间的关系。

关 键 词：抗美援朝战争 停战谈判决策 中国人民志愿军 军事战役 

分 类 号：E297.5[军事—军事理论]