化解乡镇债务中的博弈问题研究  

Study of Dissolving the Game Problems in County Debts

作　　者：文宏[1] 叶勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学 行政学院,长春130012

出　　处：《重庆工学院学报》2006年第10期29-31,52,共4页Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology

基　　金：2006年国家社科基金青年项目:取消农业税后我国乡镇债务与基层政权建设研究(06CZZ007)。

摘　　要：我国的乡镇债务数额巨大,已严重阻碍了我国农村社会经济的可持续发展,影响到乡镇政府的正常运行。以博弈论为分析工具,深入剖析化解乡镇债务的过程与症结。乡镇债务化解过程的实质是在基层行政体制领域内的一场制度变迁,确立上级政府、乡镇政府、相关债权群体多元互动的制度格局,在这一过程中存在着多重博弈关系,即政府内部还债来源的博弈、偿债责任的博弈以及乡镇政府与债权相关人之间的博弈。The huge county debts in China has seriously obstructed the sustainable development of social economy in our rural areas and affected the normal operation of township government. Based on game theory, this paper explodes the process and sticking points of dissolving county debts. The essence of dissolving county debts lies in the system transform of the administrative structure of the base level, the establishment of multi-dynamic system structure of high-level government, township government and related credit groups. In this process many game relationships occur： the game of debts repaying source in the government, the game of debts repaying responsibility, and the game of the relationship between township government and related creditors.

关 键 词：乡镇政府 化解债务 博弈 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济]