非对称信息与债权契约优化设计  

Optimization Design of Asymmetric Information and Creditor's Rights Covenants

作　　者：陈溪华[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《系统工程》2006年第9期81-83,共3页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：由于信息的非对称,作为债券投资者的债权人与作为负债方的股东或经理就必然存在利益冲突,优化设计债权契约可以避免经理或股东对自己的财富进行掠夺,或把自己的财富损失减小到最小程度。债权契约的创新性设计主要是在债权契约中加入可赎回条款。Due to the asymmetric information, there must be conflict of interest between the creditor as the investor of the bond and the debtor as the shareholder or manager. The optimization design of creditor＇s rights covenants can avoid the shareholder or manager depredatlng the fortune of the creditor, or minimizing the loss. The innovation of the creditor＇s rights covenahts is key to add the transferable term in the covenant.

关 键 词：债权契约 优化设计 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]